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CASENOTES

BULLINGTON v. MISSOURI: The
Cloning of the Prosecutorial Apple
Given the requirements for entry of a judgment of acquittal,the purposes of the
[Double Jeopardy] Clause would be negated were we to afford the government an
opportunity for the proverbial "second bite at the apple.",

There once was a man who, having properly been sentenced to
death for murder, took his place in the electric chair at the appointed hour. The executioner pulled the switch, electric current
surged through the chair, but the man survived. Apparently, due
to some mechanical problem, the current delivered to the chair was
insufficient to cause death.2 The condemned man's constitutional
claims" before the United States Supreme Court were unavailing,
and the executioner was given a second chance to carry out the
death sentence.
If a man is found guilty of murder in one portion of a trial,
and in a separate sentencing proceeding receives a sentence of
life imprisonment rather than death, does the state get a second
chance to have him. "executed" when he is granted a new trial?
Recently, the United States Supreme Court determined that a
second attempt by the prosecution to obtain a sentence of death
under these circumstances would violate the fifth amendment's
protection against double jeopardy." In Bullington v. Missouri,o
1. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1977).
2. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
3. Francis applied for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas
corpus. "By the applications petitioner claimed the protection of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that an execution under the
circumstances detailed would deny due process to him because of the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment
provision of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 461.
4. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part,
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
These few, apparently substantial words combine in such a way as to form a
concept so ephemeral that it defies definition. To understand this constitutional
phrase requires not a close scrutiny of the words themselves, but the uses to
which they have been put in the past. Some of the ways in which courts have
applied the double jeopardy concept will be analyzed infra in the section on
double jeopardy.
5. 101 S.Ct, 1852 (1981).
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the Court analyzed what appears to be the ultimate in capital sentencing procedures, a bifurcated trial6 with a sentencing hearing
which has been accorded trial status to the extent that double
jeopardy protections attach.

This casenote will examine the evolution of death penalty leg-

islation which has culminated in the standards imposed under
Missouri's statutes. Expansion and contraction of double jeopardy

protections under the fifth and fourteenth amendments by state
and federal courts will also be traced. The casenote will present
several recent cases attempting to deal with combinations of

double jeopardy and capital sentencing questions. The core of the

note will be devoted to the issues presented in the Supreme Court
and lower court decisions in this case, and an analysis of the reasoning involved in those decisions. Finally, the future implications

of the Bullington decision will be discussed.
THE DEATH PENALTY

The use of bifurcated trials in capital cases arose as a response
to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. Prior to
Furman, cases involving the death penalty were primarily concerned with attacks on the constitutionality of the death penalty
itself as cruel and unusual punishment.8 The Court in Furman ad-

6. In Missouri, a bifurcated trial involves completely separate determinations
of the issues of guilt and punishment, although these determinations are made by
the same trier of fact. See text of relevant Missouri statutes at notes 52-53 infra.
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, death penalty statutes in several states
were found to be violative of eighth and fourteenth amendment provisions, in
that they provided for cruel and unusual punishment. The eighth amendment
provides in part: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Furman was a consolidation of three cases in which the death penalty was
sought to be imposed, one under a conviction of murder and two for rape. It was
claimed that too much sentencing discretion was vested in triers of fact who, because of the absence of statutory guidance, were imposing the death penalty upon
defendants in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
8. Claims under the eighth amendment have not been limited to death penalty cases. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)(statute providing for
physical punishment, imprisonment and permanent ostracism from society for
falsifying public document found unconstitutional); State v. Brownridge, 353
S.W.2d 715 (Mo. 1962) and State v. Agee, 474 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1971) (99 year
sentences for rape found constitutional); State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.
1978) (seven year sentence for selling marijuana held permissible); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (sentence of up to five years for addiction to narcotics not allowed); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)(mandatory life sen-
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dressed the constitutionality of the manner in which the death
penalty was imposed and the validity of the underlying state statutes.9 The issues involved evoked a separate opinion from each
Justice, but the decision failed to provide clear guidelines for state
legislatures struggling to draft constitutionally acceptable death
penalty statutes.
The varied responses to Furman by the states compelled the
Supreme Court to clarify its stance. In 1976 the Court decided five
cases in which the constitutionality of state capital punishment
statutes was assailed.10 The Court invalidated statutes providing
for mandatory death sentences" and upheld statutes providing for
a bifurcated hearing for sentence determination. 2
tence under recidivist statute allowed).
The most illustrative death penalty case in this area is Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). The Supreme Court found nothing unconstitutional about an ordeal of being strapped in an electric chair for over three
hours.while repeated attempts were made to electrocute the prisoner. The Court's
decision permitted a final trip to the chair for Francis.
9. Justices Marshall and Brennan declared the death penalty to be inherently cruel and unusual under all circumstances. Justices White, Douglas and
Stewart attacked the discriminatory and standardless system of imposing the
death penalty. The dissenting justices, Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist,
agreed on one major point: it is not within the province of the United States
Supreme Court to strike down state legislation.
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
11, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 289-301, contains an extensive
discussion of the historical background of mandatory death sentences, from the
imposition of death for many crimes in the eighteenth century to a reaction
against that harshness and a move toward discretionary sentencing in the nineteenth century, and finally to the decision in Furman starting the move away
from standardless and unbridled discretion. See also McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 197-202 (1971), for a discussion of the history of discretionary capital
sentencing in England and the United States.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, also involved a mandatory death penalty.
Louisiana apparently focused on the "untrammeled discretion" language of
Furman and responded by removing all discretion from the jury. Regarding
Woodson and Roberts, the Court stated: "The fact that some states have adopted
mandatory measures following Furman while others have legislated standards to
guide jury discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court's
multi-opinioned decision in that case." Roberts, 428 U.S. at 298-99. "Juries (or
judges, as the case may be) have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die." Furman, 408 U.S. at 248.
12. In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court approved a statutory
scheme providing for a death sentence where three interrogatories, aimed at a
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Since these cases were decided, a number of decisions have reflected the struggle by individual states to impose the death penalty upon deserving murderers, while preserving the individual dignity and constitutional rights of each defendant. Constitutional
claims arose concerning statutory and judicial violations of rights
to due process, equal protection and freedom from double jeopardy. Many due process claims were argued in the context of statutory vagueness. 3 Some state statutes failed to allow adequate consideration of mitigating factors." Statutes were also assailed on the
determination that aggravating circumstances were proved, were answered affirmatively by the jury. Although specific mitigating factors were not considered by
the jury, the Court found that any mitigating factors were impliedly considered
within the context of the three questions the jury answered when considering aggravating factors.
The statutes in Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), allowed consideration
of mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances. However, the jury's determination was merely advisory and could be overturned by the trial judge.
The Court strongly approved of the statutes involved in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976). They included provisions for a bifurcated proceeding, consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and a binding effect of the jury's decision upon the judge. A death penalty could be supported only upon a finding by
the jury of the existence, beyond a reasonable doubt, of one of the statutory aggravating factors.
13. The following cases are examples of how such statutory language has
been interpreted: State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 537, 250 N.W.2d 867, 872 (1977)
("substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity," does
not apply to present crime); Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640, 658 (Ala. 1978)
("murder was intentionally committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest" only
applies "where the defendant commits a capital felony to resist an actual, lawful
arrest by an authorized individual"); State v. Payton, 361 So. 2d 866, 868 (La.
1978) (whether crime was committed in "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner" is a constitutionally acceptable question for sentence determination, but
not an element of offense); State v. Madsen, 125 Ariz. 346, 357, 609 P.2d 1046,
1052 (1980)("especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner" describes manner of
death, not extent of coldbloodedness in planning killing; also, receipt of insurance
money as result of death, where it was not shown to be motivation for murder
does not satisfy standard of commission of "offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value"); Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 431 (1980)(fact that murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim," must be supported by proof of evidence of
physical abuse or torture of the victim); People v. Superior Court, Santa Clara
County, 105 Cal. App. 3d 365, 368, 164 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (1980)(the phrase,
"The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity," is unconstitutionally vague).
14. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (Ohio's response to
Furman precluded "individualized consideration of mitigating factors" concerning
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basis that they left too much discretion with the trial judge to determine sentences or to increase sentences determined by the

jury.

15

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The roots of the concept of double jeopardy have been traced
back as far as the Greek and Roman empires.16 In the seventeenth
century Lord Coke defined the concept,17 and in the eighteenth
century the definition was refined into a "universal maxim" by
Blackstone." s Blackstone's interpretation of double jeopardy protections is now embodied in the language of the fifth amendment.19
defendant's age, character, extent of participation in the crime, and other pertinent characteristics.).
15. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), the jury, in a separate sentencing proceeding, found that the statutory aggravating factors were outweighed
by the mitigating factors and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The
Supreme Court held that the trial judge's actions in imposing a death sentence
were a violation of the defendant's right to due process. Justice Marshall, dissenting, saw a great need to reconsider the Court's approval of Florida's sentencing
scheme in Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See note 12 supra.
In Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640 (Ala. 1978), the defendant was convicted
and sentenced under statutes which, in response to Furman, had been amended
to remove all sentencing discretion from the jury. A finding of guilt mandated a
sentence of death, which could be reduced by the judge after he heard evidence in
aggravation and mitigation. The defendant's death sentence in this case was upheld by the state supreme court.
In Jacobs and Gardner, the states relied on the decision in Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), in which the Supreme Court held that imposition of
the death penalty by the trial judge after the jury had unanimously rejected that
sentence was not a denial of due process. Williams was distinguished in Gardner
on the basis of the present need, which did not exist at the time of Williams, to
look closely for constitutional flaws in sentencing procedures.
16. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-52 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting);
Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 262 nn.1 & 2 (1965).
17. "Writing in the seventeenth century, Lord Coke described the protection
afforded by the principle of double jeopardy as a function of three related common-law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon." United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340 (1975).
"Autrefois acquit" refers to a previous acquittal of the crime sought to be
reprosecuted, while "autrefois convict" is used when the accused has already been
convicted of the same offense and seeks to avoid double punishment.
18. "[T]he plea of autrefois acquit, or former acquittal, is grounded on this
universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence." 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *335.

19. "[Njor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
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Judicial determination of the precise protections afforded by the
double jeopardy clause has been difficult.
The Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce,20 allocated
double jeopardy protections to three distinct categories: protection
from reprosecution following an acquittal, reprosecution following
a conviction and multiple punishments for the same offense.21 This
analysis will focus on the first and third of these issues."
A rudimentary principle of double jeopardy theory is that a
final judgment in favor of an accused bars reprosecution of the
same offense.' 8 When a trier of fact enters a judgment of acquittal,
jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
21. Id. at 717. See also, Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-

66 (1965); Recent Development, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 715, 719-22 (1980); Stern,
Government Appeals of Sentences: A ConstitutionalResponse to Arbitrary and

Unreasonable Sentences, 18

AMER. CraM.

L.

REV.

51, 55 (1980).

22. The following cases address the issue of the power of the government to
retry a convicted defendant. Often the power is dependent upon whether the appeal was initiated by the defendant. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672
(1896) ("[A] defendant, who procures a judgment against him . ..may be tried
anew . . . for the same offence of which he had been convicted."); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173-74 (1873) ("But there is a class of cases in which a second
trial is had without violating this principle. As when . . .the verdict [has been]
set aside on motion of the accused . . . ."); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S.
416, 426 (1960) ("We believe petitioner overlooks that, when he opened up the
case by appealing from his conviction, he subjected himself to the power of the
appellate court. . . ."); Kansas City v. Henderson, 468 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo. 1971)
("It has been settled that this constitutional guarantee imposes no limitation
whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his
first conviction set aside."); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("Our
view of the Kentucky two-tier system of administering criminal justice, however,
does not lead us to believe . . . that the hazard of being penalized for seeking a
new trial . . . also inheres in the de novo trial arrangement."); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 631-32 (1976) ("The decision to secure a new trial rests
with the accused alone. . . .Nothing in the double jeopardy clause prohibits a
state from affording a defendant two opportunities to avoid conviction and secure
an acquittal.").
Often the convicted defendant is subjected to a second trial by another sovereign. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)(state conviction followed
by federal prosecution); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)(federal conviction
followed by state prosecution); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)(traffilc conviction followed by prosecution for manslaughter). See also Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519 (1975)(adjudication of guilt and sentence of commitment in a juvenile
proceeding bars subsequent prosecution as an adult despite state's characterization as continuing jeopardy).
23. See Kent, Double Jeopardy: When is an Acquittal an Acquittal?, 20
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a defendant's interest in the finality of that verdict is protected.2
Under a verdict of acquittal, however, a problem arises when the
state seeks to prosecute the same individual again for substantially
the same offense which has been given a different name.28 Such
efforts have been thwarted by invocation of the principles of res
judicata" and collateral estoppel.2 7 Under either theory, the basic
B.C.L. REV. 925, 927-28 (1979).
However, "[a governmental] appeal is impermissible only when it threatens
the defendant with a second prosecution." Edwards, Double Jeopardy Limits on
ProsecutorialAppeal of Sentences, 1980 DUKE L.J. 847, 858 (referring to cases
where a successful governmental appeal would result in reinstatement of guilty
verdict, rather than a new trial).
24. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ("A general verdict of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment undertaking to charge murder, and not objected to before the verdict as insufficient in that respect, is a bar
to a second indictment for the same killing." Id. at 669. "If the judgment is upon
an acquittal, the defendant, indeed, will not seek to have it reversed; and the
government cannot." Id. at 670. "[In this country, a verdict of acquittal, although
not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offence." Id. at 671.); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130 (1904) ("It is,
then, the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been
acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the
verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not, as
the court below held, against the peril of second punishment, but against being
again tried for the same offense."); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)(holding that the constitutional protection from double jeopardy applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment; "Petitioner was acquitted of larceny in his
first trial. Because he decided to appeal his burglary conviction, he is forced to
suffer retrial on the larceny count as well." Id. at 796. "He has ...a valid double

jeopardy plea which he cannot be forced to waive ....

Petitioner's larceny con-

viction cannot stand." Id. at 797.); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978)(in a
juvenile proceeding, a master's recommendation of not guilty does not constitute
an adjudication, and further proceedings before a judge are permissible).
25. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 268-77 (1965) for an
excellent analysis of courts' use of "same evidence" and "same transaction" tests
to determine whether two charges are, in fact, identical. Under these tests, if the
second charge requires the same proof as the first, prosecution under the second
charge is held to violate double jeopardy principles.
See generally Schulhoffer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449,
455-56 (1977).
26. "The doctrine of res judicata operates to bar all grounds for recovery
which could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between
the same parties (or their privies) on the same cause of action, if the prior suit
concluded in a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Ross v. Int'l Broth. of Electrical Workers, 634 F.2d 453, 457 (9th
Cir. 1980).
E.g., Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). The defendant was in-
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inquiry is whether the second case requires for its proof the same
evidence used unsuccessfully to prove the first case.' A related
theory is that of implied acquittal, where the underlying premise is
that once a defendant is acquitted or convicted of a lesser included
offense, it is assumed that the jury has acquitted him of any
greater offense.2 9 The question of whether a claim of double jeopdicted, tried and acquitted on a charge of conspiracy. Another indictment on the
underlying substantive offense led to a conviction. The Supreme Court held:
[T]he earlier verdict precludes a later conviction of the substantive offense. The basic facts in each trial were identical ....

It was a second

attempt to prove the agreement which at each trial was crucial to the
prosecution's case and which was necessarily adjudicated in the former
trial to be non-existent. That the prosecution may not do.
Id. at 580. See also note 25 supra.
27. "Collateral estoppel" is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in any future lawsuit.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
"Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel extends not to all claims, defenses,
and issues that might have been raised by the parties, but only to those issues
actually contested and decided." United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 903
(N.D. Ill. 1960).
One year after the decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), in
which the states were held to the federal standards of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was an integral part
of the protection against double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970). See also note 24 supra.
In Ashe, the defendant was charged with participating in an armed robbery
of six poker players. He was tried for the robbery of one of the players and acquitted because of insufficient evidence. Subsequently, the state prosecuted Ashe
for the robbery of another player, and he was convicted. In reversing his conviction, the Supreme Court said: "The question ... is simply whether, after a jury
determined by its verdict that the petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State
could constitutionally hale him before a new jury to litigate that issue again." 397
U.S. at 446.
28. In Ashe, a favorable determination of the issue of whether the defendant
was one of the robbers barred a redetermination of that issue. Thus, since the
first jury conclusively determined that he was not one of the robbers, an essential
element of any later case involving the same incident would be missing. See note
27 supra.

29. "For an offense to be a lesser offense, and included within another,
greater offense, it is necessary that the greater offense include every element of
the lesser offense plus one or more other elements." People v. Delk, 36 Ill. App. 3d
1027, 1050, 345 N.E.2d 197, 209 (1976).
In Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970), the defendant claimed that since the
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ardy may be successfully maintained often depends upon a determination of when jeopardy attached.30
When a trial ends without a conviction or acquittal, as in the
declaration of a mistrial, 1 dismissal of the indictment or the jury,32
first jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, he should not have been
retried for murder, even though the second jury also found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the first jury had
impliedly acquitted him of the charge of murder. After reversal of his first conviction, he could only have been prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter. See also
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and .United States ex rel. Hetenyi v.
Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
30. In Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), the Supreme Court determined that
the federal application of the rule that jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is
sworn is binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court held in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), that jeopardy attaches
in a nonjury trial when the first witness is sworn in.
31. E.g., Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127 (1972)(trial judge declared mistrial because of defective indictment, over defendant's objection); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973)(trial judge's declaration of mistrial over defendant's
objection because of "manifest necessity" renders retrial permissible); Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (granting prosecution's motion for mistrial without definite finding of "manifest necessity" within discretion of judge; no double
jeopardy bar to retrial); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)(mistrial
granted on defendant's motion, second trial allowed).
32. E.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
[T]he jury, being unable to agree, were discharged by the court from giving any verdict upon the indictment, without the consent of the prisoner. . . [I]n all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is
a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
Id. at 579. See also Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (jury dismissed
on motion of prosecution because a witness necessary to support part of the indictment was not served with a summons; retrial prohibited); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) ("Where the judge, acting without the defendant's
consent, aborts the proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his 'valued
rights to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal' ") (quoting Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358
(1975)(dismissal of indictment and eventual favorable disposition for defendant
precludes further prosecution); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (held
jeopardy had not yet attached where indictment was dismissed on defendant's
motion); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976)(no double jeopardy bar to
new trial where indictment dismissed on motion of defendant, absent manifest
necessity because defendant had insisted on representation by counsel who had
been expelled from courtroom for repeated misconduct); United States v. Martin
Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564 (1977)(prosecution prohibited from retrying defendant where trial judge entered judgment of acquittal following failure of jury to
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or direction of a verdict," the issue of whether jeopardy has attached becomes critical. When, however, there is a final verdict of
acquittal34 or conviction" in one court, a new prosecution may be
had in a court of another jurisdiction without offending fifth
amendment guarantees.
When a conviction is overturned on appeal, the prosecution
often seeks conviction at the new trial for a greater charge than
that found at the first trial or seeks a higher sentence than that
originally imposed. This practice has generally been held to be violative of the defendant's right to be free from the threat of receiving multiple punishments for the same offense. 6 Nevertheless,
every general rule is the parent of powerful exceptions. In North
Carolina v. Pearce,3 7 the Supreme Court held that the United
States Constitution does not expressly prohibit a higher sentence
following a retrial." But the Court, at least in the context of bench
agree on a verdict); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977)(defendant's pretrial
motion to dismiss indictment not granted until close of evidence-second trial
and conviction valid).
33. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (directed verdict of
acquittal at mid-trial operates as a final and non-appealable verdict of acquittal
for double jeopardy purposes).
34. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)(acquittal in federal court for
robbery of a federally insured bank did not preclude later trial and conviction
under state robbery statute in state court).
35. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)(conviction for conspiracy to violate Illinois statute does not prevent federal prosecution for conspiracy
to violate similar federal statute); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)(state allowed to prosecute defendant for involuntary manslaughter after previous conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid accident, arising out of same occurrence).
36. E.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). Under a statute providing for punishment by a fine or by imprisonment for up to one year, both
penalties were imposed. After defendant had been imprisoned for five days and
had paid the fine, the original judgment was vacated and a new sentence of one
year from that date was imposed. Since return of the fine was impossible under
the statute, the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and it was held that
the defendant had been twice punished for one offense. "Manifestly it is not the
danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that
would legally follow the second conviction, which is the real danger guarded
against by the Constitution." Id. at 173. See also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262, nn.12-14; Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. Rav. 1001,
1023-33 (1980); Recent Development, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 715, 721-22 (1980).
37. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
38. "Long-established constitutional doctrine makes clear that. . . the guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction." Id. at 719.
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trials, required a showing of specific justification for imposition of
a higher sentence.3 9
This requirement was intended to preclude the possibility of
vindictiveness on the part of the trial judge against a defendant
who has been successful in appealing the first conviction. 0 Later
decisions have extended the scope of Pearce's limitations to cases
where there is a threat of prosecutorial vindictiveness, but not to
cases of jury resentencing.4 1 As the Court stated in Pearce, there is
no absolute prohibition against imposition of an increased sentence
at a defendant's new trial. When, however, the new trial presents

the possibility that a former sentence of incarceration will be
39. To avoid the possibility that the increased sentence by the trial judge
resulted from vindictiveness against the defendant for having had his conviction
overturned, the Supreme Court imposed certain restrictions. The judge must state
his reasons for the increase in sentence "based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time
of the original sentencing proceeding." Id. at 726.
40. It can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant violation of the
fourteenth amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced
practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his having
succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside."
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of
such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise
of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
Id. at 723-25.
41. E.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971)(in a trial de novo after
the sentence has already been served, Pearce'sprotections don't apply); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)(Pearce is limited to nonjury trials-there is no
possibility of vindictiveness in jury sentencing as long as the jury is unaware of
the first sentence); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)(appeal of a sentence
under a misdemeanor charge precludes a subsequent indictment for the same conduct as a felony; here, the source of vindictiveness was the prosecutor, not the
judge); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980)(federal statute allowing
for increased sentence upon proof defendant is a "dangerous special offender" not
a product of vindictiveness; statute specifically provides for appeal of sentence by
government; criminal sentence is not accorded the same finality as an acquittal).
See also Edwards, Double Jeopardy Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal of
Sentences, DuKE L.J. 847, 851 (1980); Recent Development, 65 CORNELL L. REV.
715, 721-22, (1980); Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:Reflections on
Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1023-33
(1980).
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transformed into a death sentence, double jeopardy considerations
compel a very close scrutiny of the sentencing process.
DEATH PENALTY AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
2
case.

The threat of a higher sentence upon reconviction becomes
very grave when that higher sentence may be a sentence of death.
The gravity of such a threat demands scrupulous attention to safeguarding a defendant's right to be free from having his life put in
jeopardy more than once for the same crime. Imposition of the
death penalty in a second trial where life imprisonment was the
sentence found in the first trial was put in issue as long ago as
1882."
In Stroud v. United States," the defendant was found guilty

of first degree murder, and the sentence was mitigated to life imprisonment. His next trial resulted in a sentence of death. On appeal, the Supreme Court found no constitutional bar to the increased sentence.45 In Green v. United States,4" the defendant
appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on the basis of
42. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305.

43. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882). At the time the murder was committed, state law recognized a life sentence as an acquittal of first degree murder.

This law was changed prior to defendant's trial, but the Supreme Court held that
he was entitled to rely on the previous statute. The decision turned on the ex post
facto nature of applying the new statute. The Court found the new law valid in
other respects.

44. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
45. In the last conviction the jury did not add the words "without capital
punishment" to the verdict, although the court in its charge particularly
called the attention of the jury to this statutory provision. In such case
the court could do no less than inflict the death penalty. Moreover, the
conviction and sentence upon the former trials were reversed upon writs
of error sued out by the plaintiff -in error.
Id. at 18.
Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)(Here the second trial resulted
from an appeal by the prosecution. Palko was decided before the double jeopardy
clause was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
46. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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insufficient evidence. The new trial resulted in a conviction for
first-degree murder which carried a mandatory penalty of death.
The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that his first
conviction constituted an acquittal of first-degree murder, for
which he could not constitutionally be retried. 7
Since Green, many state courts have relied on its rationale in
prohibiting higher punishment on retrial in death penalty cases on
double jeopardy grounds. Most recent cases have resulted in a
finding that where a death sentence was not imposed in the first
trial it should not be sought or imposed at a subsequent trial.
47. The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 187-88.
48. A defendant's right to appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that right.
Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has
no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable
conditions on the right to appeal.
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 499, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86, 386 P.2d 677, 686
(1963).
"By placing this unconscionable premium upon a successful appeal by an accused, a vital societal interest is threatened-assuring that liberty shall not be
deprived without a trial free from legal error prejudicing the accused's substantial
rights." United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 859 (2d Cir. 1965).
The prisoner must decide whether to abandon his constitutional right to
a fair trial and serve out his prison term under an invalid or unchallenged sentence, or exercise his statutory right to appeal in order to
achieve his constitutional right to a fair trial, at the risk that his second
trial might result in the imposition of the death penalty. This makes the
price of an appeal from an erroneous judgment in a first degree murder
case the risk of a man's life ....

[T]his choice not only shocks the con-

science and offends our sense of justice, but also rises to an unconstitutional condition.
Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 340, 250 A.2d 811, 813-14 (1969).
A careful study of the Pearce case leads to the conclusion that regardless
of the personalities involved in the proceedings at trials, unless the record in the second trial shows that defendant has done a more severe act
against society or that evidence is more persuasive against defendant,
than in the first trial, the punishment cannot exceed that meted out at
the first trial.
Roberson v. State, 258 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1972).
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FACTS OF BULLINGTON V. MISSOURI

In September of 1977, a young woman was abducted from her
home by an armed intruder. Her mother and brother were tied up
by the man and left in the home. The ensuing police investigation
implicated Robert Bullington, and a warrant was issued for his arrest for the kidnapping. A week after the abduction, the victim's
body was discovered floating in a creek. The cause of death was
determined by the medical examiner to have been drowning. The
search for Bullington was further fortified by an arrest warrant for
murder."9
Bullington was arrested in October in California, waived extradition and was brought back to Missouri. He was identified by the
victim's brother as the intruder. In December, Robert Bullington
was indicted for capital murder, kidnapping, armed criminal action, burglary in the first degree and two counts of flourishing a
dangerous and deadly weapon.
At trial, 50 the jury found Bullington guilty on all counts. As
required by statute, the capital murder count 1 was tried in a biTo affirm the death penalty we must find that the death penalty is not
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. That is impossible here because we have an identical case involving the same defendant in which the death penalty was not imposed. The same defendant
was tried previously on the same charges and the jury imposed a life
sentence. Therefore the death sentence in the case under review is obviously disproportionate to the life sentence previously imposed against
the same defendant in the same case.
Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 210, 236 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1977).
Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)(death sentence set
aside because of insufficiency of evidence to prove aggravating circumstance; state
can't seek death penalty a second time).
[Hiaving received a favorable answer to the second punishment issue in
his first trial, appellant Sanne should not have been subjected to the risk
of receiving a penalty of death upon his retrial following reversal of his
first conviction.
Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
But see Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1979), and Redd v. State,
242 Ga. 876, 252 S.E.2d 383 (1979), where a higher sentence of death on retrial
was held not to violate double jeopardy protections.
49. See Brief for Petitioner at 2-5.
50. Defendant was granted his pre-trial motion for a change of venue from
St. Louis County to Jackson County, Missouri.
51. "Any person who unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with
premeditation kills or causes the killing of another human being is guilty of the
offense of capital murder." Mo. REV. STAT. §565.001 (1978).
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furcated proceeding wherein an adjudication of guilt in the first
phase5 2 was followed by a determination of sentence in a separate
sentencing trial.58 In the sentencing phase, evidence of aggravating
circumstances5 4 was presented to the same jury that had found
52. Mo. REV. STAT. §565.006.1 (1978) reads in pertinent part:
At the conclusion of all trials upon an indictment or information for capital murder heard by a jury, and after argument of counsel and proper
charge from the court, the jury shall retire to consider a verdict of guilty
or not guilty without any consideration of punishment, and by their verdict ascertain whether the defendant is guilty of capital murder, murder
in the first degree, murder in the second degree, manslaughter, or is not
guilty of any offense.
53. Mo. REV. STAT. §565.006.2 (1978) provides:
Where the jury or judge returns a verdict or finding of guilty as provided
in subsection 1 of this section, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury or judge, at which time the
only issue shall be the determination of the punishment to be imposed.
In such hearing, subject to the laws of evidence, the jury or judge shall
hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of
punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and
pleas of guilty, or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The jury or judge shall also
hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding the punishment to be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall open and the defendant shall conclude the argument to the jury
or judge. Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge shall
give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire to determine the punishment to be imposed. In capital murder cases in which
the death penalty may be imposed by the jury or judge sitting without a
jury, the additional procedure provided in section 565.012 shall be followed. The jury, or the judge in cases tried by a judge, shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law. The judge shall impose the
sentence fixed by the jury or judge. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree to the punishment, the judge shall impose sentence
within the limits of the law; except that, the judge shall in no instance
impose the death penalty when, in cases tried by a jury, the jury cannot
agree upon the punishment.
54. Mo.. REV. STAT. §565.012.1 (1978) provides:
In all cases of capital murder for which the death penalty is authorized,
the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury
for it to consider:
(1) Any of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection 2 which may be supported by the evidence,
(2) Any of the statutory mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsection 3 which may be supported by the evidence,
(3) Any mitigating or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized
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Bullington guilty. The jury was charged with determining whether
the defendant should receive a sentence of life imprisonment with
no possibility of probation or parole for fifty years or a sentence of
death." The aggravating circumstances presented by the State to
the jury for its consideration were required to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt 6 to justify imposition of the death penalty. The
jury rejected the State's case for death and imposed a sentence of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole or probation for
fifty years.
The defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial was granted
by the trial judge.57 Before the new trial commenced, the prosecuby law, and
(4) Whether a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist to warrant the imposition of death or whether a sufficient mitigating
circumstance or circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found to exist.
Mo. REV. STAT. §565.012.4 (1978) provides:
The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury
for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death,
shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Mo. REV. STAT. §565.012.5 (1978) provides: "Unless at least one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances enumerated in this section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed."
55. Mo. REV. STAT. §565.008.1 (1978) provides:
Persons convicted of the offense of capital murder shall, if the judge or
jury so recommends after complying with the provisions of sections
565.006 and 565.012, be punished by death. If the judge or jury does not
recommend the imposition of the death penalty on a finding of guilty of
capital murder, the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment
by the division of corrections during his natural life and shall not be eligible for probation or parole until he has served a minimum of fifty years
of his sentence.
56. The prosecution in this case attempted to prove the following two statutory aggravating circumstances:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of
conviction for capital murder, or the offense was committed by a person
who had a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictiohs;
and
(7) The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind.
Mo. REV. STAT. §565.012.2 (1978).
57. Bullington had made a pre-trial motion to quash the jury panel. While
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tion indicated its intent to renew its efforts to obtain the death
penalty.5 8 Bullington's response set off a chain of legal maneuvers
which brought the case before the Missouri Supreme Court.s"
There it was held that nothing in the state or federal constitutions,
including the double jeopardy clause, prevented the State from relitigating the issue of punishment. 0
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which granted certiorari" and on May 4, 1981 rendered its decision. 2 The Supreme Court declared that because the sentencing
hearing in this case so resembled a trial on guilt, the defendant was
protected by the double jeopardy clause from facing a redetermination of his sentence.
In upholding Bullington's double jeopardy claim, a majority of
the Court's focused on the procedural aspects of the sentencing
phase of the trial. Missouri statutes require that the State prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory
his post-trial motion for a new trial was pending, the Supreme Court decided in
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 359 (1979), that the jury selection procedures used in
Missouri were unconstitutional. Under the Missouri constitution and statutes, women were automatically allowed to claim exemption from jury duty, depriving defendants of their right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
The grant of a new trial to Bullington was based on the Duren decision.
58. The prosecution had filed a Notice of Evidence in Aggravation.
Mo. REV. STAT. §565.006.2 (1978) provides: "Only such evidence in aggravation as
the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be
admissible."
59. Defendant filed a motion before the trial judge to strike the State's notice
and to exclude from trial the evidence in aggravation. The trial judge declared his
intention to grant defendant's motion, and the State responded by seeking a writ
of prohibition to prevent the motion from being officially granted. When the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District refused to issue the writ, the
State sought and was granted a preliminary writ of prohibition by the Supreme
Court of Missouri. Subsequently this court, in the reported decision, made the
writ absolute. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980).
60. Id.
61. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
62. Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
63. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Stevens concurred. Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist
joined.
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aggravating circumstance." The jury's decision is limited to two
possible sentences." Members of the jury are provided with stan-

dards to guide them in reaching their decision." Finally, the sentence is determined in a separate portion of a bifurcated trial,
before the same jury in a setting and under procedures resembling
the guilt portion of the trial."7
These trial-like procedures were sufficient for the Court to distinguish several cases relied upon by the Missouri Supreme Court
and by the dissenting justices.ss Stroud v. United States" was decided when there were no standards to guide the jury's decision. A
guilty verdict to a charge of first degree murder meant a death
penalty unless the jury qualified its verdict with the words, "with-

out capital punishment." Without guidance, the jury's decision was
entirely discretionary. In North Carolinav. Pearce1 0 the judge had
no statutory guidance in choosing a sentence ranging from one to
fifteen years of imprisonment. Likewise, the jury in Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe7 1 had complete and standardless discretion in imposing sentences for robbery ranging from four years to the death
penalty.ls

64. See note 54 supra.
65. The jury may impose a sentence of death or of life imprisonment without
parole or probation for fifty years. See note 55 supra.
66. See note 56 supra for the precise language of the aggravating factors involved in this case.
67. See 101 S. Ct. at 1858 n.10, where the Court points out the trial-like features of the sentencing procedures.
68. In contrast, the sentencing procedures considered in the Court's previous cases did not have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence.
In Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud, there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to prove-beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise-additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence. In each of those cases, moreover, the sentencer's
discretion was essentially unfettered.
101 S. Ct. at 1858.
69. 251 U.S. 15 (1919). See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
70. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
71. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). See note 41 and accompanying text supra. Chaffin
had urged that limitations be set on the broad sentencing discretion of the jury.
Although this case arose in Georgia and involved the possible imposition of the
death penalty, there was no mention in the opinion of Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), which was decided by the Court in the previous term.
See also notes 7 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
72. See 101 S.Ct. at 1858 n.13, where the Bullington Court points out that
the absence of consideration by the Chafin jury'of aggravating or mitigating circumstances "starkly illustrates the significant difference between the sentencing
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None of the above cases were concerned with sentencing in the
context of a bifurcated trial. The only such case previously decided
73 Appeal
by the Supreme Court was United States v. DiFrancesco.
by the government of DiFrancesco's sentence was allowed under
the Organized Crime Control Act.7 4 Proof of additional facts quali-

fying defendant as a "dangerous special offender" had to be made
by a preponderance of the evidence. The range of sentence increase was from one to twenty-five years. Finally, this procedure
involved appellate review of the sentence, not a new trial as in
Bullington.
A major aspect of the Court's analysis in Bullington was the
characterization of the defendant's previous life sentence as a failure of the State to prove its case for the death penalty. This
brought the case within the exception to the rule that a defendant's sentence may be increased on retrial when he has succeeded
in having his first conviction reversed. 7 5 The Court pointed out
that, in Burks v. United States,"7 the Court declared that appellate reversal of a conviction on the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency was identical to a jury acquittal, since the State's failure of
proof meant that "the jury could not properly have returned a verprocedure in that case and the procedure now required by Missouri in a capital
murder case."
73. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
74. 18 U.S.C. §§3575-76 (1970). Under this statute, the prosecutor is required
prior to trial to file a notice indicating his intent to seek an increase in defendant's sentence upon conviction subject to proof of defendant's status as a dangerous special offender. Section 3575(e) defines a dangerous special offender as
one who has been convicted of two or more prior felonies, or who has committed
the present felony as part of a pattern or way of life in which he possesses skill or
expertise, or who has committed the present felony as part of a criminal
conspiracy.
The prosecution's burden of proof as to these elements is by a preponderance
of the evidence:
If it appears by a preponderance of the information. . .that the defendant is a dangerous special offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five
years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.
18 U.S.C. §3575(b)(1970).
DiFrancesco's sentence was increased under this statute by one year.
75. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Price v. Georgia, 398
U.S. 323 (1970); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). See also notes 46-48
supra.
76. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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dict of guilty."' "

The Court's next step in the analysis was to identify the pros-

ecution's failure of proof on the issue of punishment as an acquit-

tal of the death penalty.7 8 As a final verdict of acquittal, the sentencing issue cannot be relitigated 79 thereby giving the prosecution
another chance to prove its case.8 0 In conclusion the Court stated:
Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was
like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a
jury also is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at
81
his retrial.

The Court did not reach a decision on Bullington's claims
under the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments since it had

decided the case entirely on fifth amendment double jeopardy

grounds.8" Each of these issues was extensively argued and summa77. Id. at 16.
78. The Court cited with approval the dissent of the Missouri Supreme
Court. "[T]he jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary
to impose the death sentence." State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d at 922
(Bardgett, J., dissenting).
79. "A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course,
absolutely final. The values that underlie this principle... are equally applicable
when a jury has rejected the State's claim that the defendant deserves to die." 101
S. Ct. at 1861. See also notes 23 & 24 supra.
80. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 15-18.
81. 101 S.Ct. at 1862.
82. In addition to his double jeopardy claim, Bullington presented the following issues for review:
(1) Sixth Amendment: Given the protections against a higher sentence on
retrial by a judge as mandated by Pearce, but not required in jury cases under
Chaffin, Bullington would be precluded from exercising his right to a jury trial if
he desired to avoid imposition of the death penalty on retrial. He would be "chilled" from requesting a jury determination not only on the question of punishment, but on the issue of guilt as well. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text
supra.
(2) Eighth Amendment: The excessiveness and disproportionality of a particular sentence is determined on the basis of sentences meted out in similar
cases. Here, the most similar case is Bullington's first trial. Therefore, the death
penalty would be excessive and disproportionate compared to the sentence he received at his first trial. See Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 236 S.E.2d 365 (1977) and
note 48 supra.
(3) Fourteenth Amendment: The language of the two statutory aggravating
circumstances sought to be proved by the State is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. At oral argument, the prosecution urged the Supreme Court to defer
decision on this issue until the Missouri Supreme Court could address the ques-
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rily rejected in the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court.8 However, once the United States Supreme Court determined that a
capital sentencing hearing in Missouri deserved trial status, its application of double jeopardy protections resolved the issue
presented.
The dissenting Justices in Bullington refused to recognize the
similarities between the findings in the guilt and, punishment
phases of the Missouri bifurcated system. 4 By rejecting the
trial-like aspects of the sentencing procedures, the dissent found
no justification for distinguishing the Stroud-Pearce-ChaffinDiFrancescorationales. Since those cases held that a new trial ordered on the defendant's motion wiped the slate clean, the previous life sentence could not be considered an acquittal of the death
penalty."8 Thus the dissent concluded that the double jeopardy
clause did not bar imposition of a higher sentence at the second
trial.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Supreme Court has elevated the sentencing phase of Missouri's bifurcated capital murder trials to the position of a separate
trial. As such, in the proceeding to determine the sentence to be
imposed, the same constitutional rights recognized in any other
trial situation attach.
The Court's application of double jeopardy protections to a
sentencing determination which provides full trial-like procedural
tion itself in several cases pending before it. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-

38.

83. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980). While the
Missouri high court confronted all of defendant's arguments, its decision ultimately rested on the double jeopardy problem. That court's reliance on Stroud,
Chaffin and Pearce was reiterated by the dissenting Justices of the United States
Supreme Court. Likewise, the Bullington majority distinguished these cases in

the same way that the Missouri dissent had done.
84. "It is well-established law that the double jeopardy clause does not apply
to sentencing decisions after retrial with the same force that it applies to redetermination of guilt or innocence." 101 S. Ct. at 1862.
85. The dissenting Justices, perhaps mistakenly, consistently referred to the
majority's application of the doctrine of "implied acquittal" rather than "acquittal". This misinterpretation of the Court's language, if picked up in future decisions, would tend to weaken the Court's holding. The line of cases decided on the
grounds of "implied acquittal" (see note 29 and accompanying text supra) pro-

vides less forceful precedent than does the long-established rule that a jury acquittal is final and unassailable. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
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safeguards raises the question whether these procedural safeguards
are now constitutionally required. If so, all states not presently affording such protections as the right to counsel and the right of
cross-examination under their death'penalty statutes may be compelled to alter these statutes and adopt Missouri's standards.80 If
not, the question becomes whether state legislatures will feel compelled to adopt Missouri's statutory scheme purely on the basis of
the Supreme Court's apparent approval of that state's system. It
appears unlikely that there will be an immediate reaction to revise
death penalty legislation purely on the weight of the Bullington
decision.
It is difficult to predict the future application of this decision.
Justice Potter Stewart, who has retired from the Court, may have
been the swing vote in this case.8 7 There is no indication as to the
philosophy of his replacement in this area of law. Bullington may
be limited to its facts, or it may engender further Court decisions
expanding the rights of defendants in capital cases.
The Court has placed its approval on Missouri's capital sentencing provisions. This may be a broad hint to the states of what
it considers to be constitutionally acceptable post-Furman death
penalty legislation. It remains to be seen whether the Court will
further refine this hint into a mandate. For the present, Bullington
has encouraged further scrutiny of the death penalty and the manner in which it is imposed. The bottom line is that "death is
different." 88
86. See Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981), in which a unanimous
Court held that defendant's sentence of death was unconstitutionally imposed.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Smith was subjected to a brief interview with a
psychiatrist without having been informed of his fifth amendment right to remain
silent. At the sentencing hearing, the psychiatrist relied on defendant's statements in his testimony for the prosecution. The Court upheld the claim of the
defense that this course of events resulted in compulsory self-incrimination by the
defendant.
See also Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations,19 AMER. CRIM. L. R.v. 1 (1981). Dix
addresses due process and evidentiary issues arising in the context of sentencing
hearings.
87. In U.S. v. Di Francesco, 449 U.S. 819 (1980), Justice Stewart voted with
the majority, which held that the Constitution did not prohibit a sentence increase under a prosecutorial appeal. The procedural differences between Bullington and DiFrancesco,discussed in notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra may
explain Justice Stewart's vote in Bullington.
88. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18.
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CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court decided in Furman v. Georgia89 that
the death penalty was being imposed with "unbridled discretion"
and without meaningful standards to guide the trier of fact, it set
in motion legislative reactions culminating in the statutory structure under which Robert Bullington was sentenced. In its efforts to
comply with the mandates of Furman, Missouri has effectively
cloned the guilt or innocence trial. In its bifurcated capital trials,
the state has created two trials, where the only difference between
the two is the jury's verdict. In one, the jury (or judge) decides
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. In the other, it decides
whether he will die or be imprisoned. The mechanics of reaching
either decision are identical.
The Supreme Court has recognized this cloning effect by finding that the same constitutional protections apply to the sentencing proceeding as previously applied only to the guilt determination proceeding. By way of the double jeopardy clause, the Court
has declared that this type of sentencing hearing is a trial. Where
formerly the prosecution was allowed only one bite of the apple, it
is now given two apples and allowed one bite of each.
CAROL EVANS WALKER

89. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 7 & 9 and accompanying text supra.

